Channel integration and profit sharing in the dynamics of multi-channel firms

Ruiliang Yan, John Wang, Bin Zhou

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

31 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

With the rapid development of e-commerce, many brick and mortar firms are increasingly creating e-commerce channels that operate quite independently from existing physical channels, which lead to intensive channel conflicts. Channel integration with profit sharing can effectively eliminate channel conflicts and improve channel coordination for these multi-channel firms. In this study, we focus on the strategic role played by channel integration with profit sharing in the online-traditional channel competition. We use a game theoretic approach to investigate this issue. We compare non-integrated channel profits with integrated channel profits to show that both the online and traditional channels always benefit from a channel integration strategy by capturing some portion of the incremental profit gains generated by an integrated channel. We utilize a profit bargaining model to implement profit sharing for the online and traditional channels to achieve their channel integration. Based on our results, optimal marketing strategies are derived.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)430-440
Number of pages11
JournalJournal of Retailing and Consumer Services
Volume17
Issue number5
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Sep 2010

Fingerprint

Profit sharing
Channel integration
Profit
Integrated
Channel conflict
Electronic commerce
Bargaining model
Marketing strategy
Channel coordination
Incremental
Channel competition

Keywords

  • Bargaining
  • Channel coordination
  • E-marketing
  • Game theory
  • Marketing strategies
  • Retailing

Cite this

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Channel integration and profit sharing in the dynamics of multi-channel firms. / Yan, Ruiliang; Wang, John; Zhou, Bin.

In: Journal of Retailing and Consumer Services, Vol. 17, No. 5, 01.09.2010, p. 430-440.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

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