TY - GEN
T1 - Federated Learning in Competitive EV Charging Market
AU - Sun, Chenxi
AU - Huang, Chao
AU - Shou, Biying
AU - Huang, Jianwei
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 IEEE.
PY - 2023
Y1 - 2023
N2 - Federated Learning (FL) has demonstrated a significant potential to improve the quality of service (QoS) of EV charging stations. While existing studies have primarily focused on developing FL algorithms, the effect of FL on the charging stations’ operation in terms of price competition has yet to be fully understood. This paper aims to fill this gap by modeling the strategic interactions between two charging stations and EV owners as a multi-stage game. Each station first decides its FL participation strategy and charging price, and then individual EV owners decide their charging strategies. The game analysis involves solving a non-concave problem and by decomposing it into a piece-wise concave program we manage to fully characterize the equilibrium. Based on real-world datasets, our numerical results reveal an interesting insight: even if FL improves QoS, it can lead to smaller profits for both stations. The key reason is that FL intensifies the price competition between charging stations by improving stations’ QoS to a similar level. We further show that the stations will participate in FL when their data distributions are mildly dissimilar.
AB - Federated Learning (FL) has demonstrated a significant potential to improve the quality of service (QoS) of EV charging stations. While existing studies have primarily focused on developing FL algorithms, the effect of FL on the charging stations’ operation in terms of price competition has yet to be fully understood. This paper aims to fill this gap by modeling the strategic interactions between two charging stations and EV owners as a multi-stage game. Each station first decides its FL participation strategy and charging price, and then individual EV owners decide their charging strategies. The game analysis involves solving a non-concave problem and by decomposing it into a piece-wise concave program we manage to fully characterize the equilibrium. Based on real-world datasets, our numerical results reveal an interesting insight: even if FL improves QoS, it can lead to smaller profits for both stations. The key reason is that FL intensifies the price competition between charging stations by improving stations’ QoS to a similar level. We further show that the stations will participate in FL when their data distributions are mildly dissimilar.
KW - charging stations
KW - competitive pricing
KW - Electric vehicles (EV)
KW - federated learning (FL)
KW - game theory
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85180855116
U2 - 10.1109/ISGTEUROPE56780.2023.10407634
DO - 10.1109/ISGTEUROPE56780.2023.10407634
M3 - Conference contribution
AN - SCOPUS:85180855116
T3 - IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference Europe
BT - Proceedings of 2023 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe, ISGT EUROPE 2023
PB - IEEE Computer Society
T2 - 2023 IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Europe, ISGT EUROPE 2023
Y2 - 23 October 2023 through 26 October 2023
ER -