Fleurbaey-Michel conjecture on equitable weak Paretian social welfare order

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

The paper examines the problem of explicit description of a social welfare order over infinite utility streams, which respects anonymity and weak Pareto axioms. It provides a complete characterization of the domains of one period utilities, for which it is possible to explicitly describe a weak Paretian social welfare order satisfying the anonymity axiom. For domains containing any set of order type similar to the set of positive and negative integers, every equitable social welfare order satisfying the weak Pareto axiom is non-constructive. The paper resolves a conjecture by Fleurbaey and Michel (2003) that there exists no explicit (that is, avoiding the axiom of choice or similar contrivances) description of an ordering which satisfies weak Pareto and indifference to finite permutations. It also provides an interesting connection between the existence of social welfare function and the constructive nature of social welfare order by showing that the domain restrictions for the two are identical.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)434-439
Number of pages6
JournalJournal of Mathematical Economics
Volume47
Issue number4-5
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Aug 2011

Fingerprint

Welfare
Pareto
Anonymity
Axiom
Axiom of choice
Order Type
Axioms
Resolve
Permutation
Social welfare
Restriction
Integer

Keywords

  • Anonymity
  • Non-Ramsey set
  • Order type
  • Social welfare order
  • Weak Pareto

Cite this

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Fleurbaey-Michel conjecture on equitable weak Paretian social welfare order. / Dubey, Ram.

In: Journal of Mathematical Economics, Vol. 47, No. 4-5, 01.08.2011, p. 434-439.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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