TY - JOUR
T1 - From central office to portfolio manager in three cities
T2 - Responding to the principal-agent problem
AU - Bulkley, Katrina E.
AU - Torres, A. Christopher
AU - Hashim, Ayesha K.
AU - Woodward, Sarah
AU - Marsh, Julie A.
AU - Strunk, Katharine O.
AU - Harris, Douglas N.
N1 - Funding Information:
This study was made possible through the support of the Spencer Foundation. The authors thank other members of the research team for their support in data collection and analysis. We are grateful to Dana Mitra and the anonymous reviewers for their feedback on this project. We would also like to thank the school districts in Los Angeles, New Orleans, and Denver for partnering with us in our research and granting access to their schools and personnel, and the individuals in our three case studies for sharing their time and experiences with us.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved.
PY - 2021/8
Y1 - 2021/8
N2 - A number of districts are moving toward a portfolio management model, in which central offices act as “portfolio managers” (PMs) that oversee—but may not actively manage—publicly funded schools. Using principal-agent theory, with its focus on goal alignment and the use of incentives, we explore how PMs operated in ways distinct from traditional district offices in Denver, New Orleans, and Los Angeles. We consider how PMs identify the goals of multiple principals, incentivize and monitor agents around principals’ goals, and select and develop agents who can meet principals’ goals. Drawing on 76 system-level interviews, we find that PMs in each city confronted similar tensions around PM responsibilities but addressed them differently. Specifically, we observed distinct PM approaches to managing competing goals of stakeholders in the context of school closure and to balancing school-based autonomy with more prescriptive measures for building school capacity and ensuring the equitable treatment of students.
AB - A number of districts are moving toward a portfolio management model, in which central offices act as “portfolio managers” (PMs) that oversee—but may not actively manage—publicly funded schools. Using principal-agent theory, with its focus on goal alignment and the use of incentives, we explore how PMs operated in ways distinct from traditional district offices in Denver, New Orleans, and Los Angeles. We consider how PMs identify the goals of multiple principals, incentivize and monitor agents around principals’ goals, and select and develop agents who can meet principals’ goals. Drawing on 76 system-level interviews, we find that PMs in each city confronted similar tensions around PM responsibilities but addressed them differently. Specifically, we observed distinct PM approaches to managing competing goals of stakeholders in the context of school closure and to balancing school-based autonomy with more prescriptive measures for building school capacity and ensuring the equitable treatment of students.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85108086000&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1086/715034
DO - 10.1086/715034
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85108086000
SN - 0195-6744
VL - 127
SP - 597
EP - 626
JO - American Journal of Education
JF - American Journal of Education
IS - 4
ER -