Is information sharing profitable in e-business age?

Ruiliang Yan, John Wang, Bin Zhou, Peijun Guo

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

8 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Is information sharing profitable for the competitive channel retailers? In order to answer this question, we use a game-theoretic model with Bayesian forecasting to investigate the benefits of cooperative information sharing for the online and traditional retailers. We assume that online and traditional retailers have their own private forecasting information about the market demand (asymmetric information). Our results show that when the online and traditional retailers share their private forecasting information, both retailers will be better off if they have a close forecast. Furthermore, if retailer individual information is less accurate and channel competition is more intense, information sharing becomes much more necessary to each retailer. Based on our results, optimal marketing strategies are derived and important managerial implications are provided.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1-10
Number of pages10
JournalInternational Journal of Applied Decision Sciences
Volume5
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2012

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Retailers
Electronic business
Information sharing
Channel competition
Marketing strategy
Asymmetric information
Market demand
Bayesian forecasting
Game-theoretic models

Keywords

  • Distribution channels
  • Game theory
  • Information sharing
  • Marketing research

Cite this

Yan, Ruiliang ; Wang, John ; Zhou, Bin ; Guo, Peijun. / Is information sharing profitable in e-business age?. In: International Journal of Applied Decision Sciences. 2012 ; Vol. 5, No. 1. pp. 1-10.
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Is information sharing profitable in e-business age? / Yan, Ruiliang; Wang, John; Zhou, Bin; Guo, Peijun.

In: International Journal of Applied Decision Sciences, Vol. 5, No. 1, 01.01.2012, p. 1-10.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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