Patent quality and a two-tiered patent system

Vidya Atal, Talia Bar

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper, we study the determinants of patent quality and volume of patent applications when inventors care about perceived patent quality. We analyze the effects of various policy reforms, specifically, a proposal to establish a two-tiered patent system. In the two-tiered system, applicants can choose between a regular patent and a more costly, possibly more thoroughly examined, 'gold-plate' patent. Introducing a second patent-tier can reduce patent applications, reduce the incidence of bad patents, and sometimes increase social welfare. The gold-plate tier attracts inventors with high ex-ante probability of validity, but not necessarily applicants with innovations of high economic value.

Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)503-540
Number of pages38
JournalJournal of Industrial Economics
Volume62
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - 1 Jan 2014

Fingerprint

Patent quality
Patent system
Patents
Inventor
Economic value
Innovation
Social welfare
Policy reform

Cite this

Atal, Vidya ; Bar, Talia. / Patent quality and a two-tiered patent system. In: Journal of Industrial Economics. 2014 ; Vol. 62, No. 3. pp. 503-540.
@article{0f1d37af007b4e81a9d073ae22fc5a6a,
title = "Patent quality and a two-tiered patent system",
abstract = "In this paper, we study the determinants of patent quality and volume of patent applications when inventors care about perceived patent quality. We analyze the effects of various policy reforms, specifically, a proposal to establish a two-tiered patent system. In the two-tiered system, applicants can choose between a regular patent and a more costly, possibly more thoroughly examined, 'gold-plate' patent. Introducing a second patent-tier can reduce patent applications, reduce the incidence of bad patents, and sometimes increase social welfare. The gold-plate tier attracts inventors with high ex-ante probability of validity, but not necessarily applicants with innovations of high economic value.",
author = "Vidya Atal and Talia Bar",
year = "2014",
month = "1",
day = "1",
doi = "10.1111/joie.12055",
language = "English",
volume = "62",
pages = "503--540",
journal = "Journal of Industrial Economics",
issn = "0022-1821",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd",
number = "3",

}

Patent quality and a two-tiered patent system. / Atal, Vidya; Bar, Talia.

In: Journal of Industrial Economics, Vol. 62, No. 3, 01.01.2014, p. 503-540.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleResearchpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Patent quality and a two-tiered patent system

AU - Atal, Vidya

AU - Bar, Talia

PY - 2014/1/1

Y1 - 2014/1/1

N2 - In this paper, we study the determinants of patent quality and volume of patent applications when inventors care about perceived patent quality. We analyze the effects of various policy reforms, specifically, a proposal to establish a two-tiered patent system. In the two-tiered system, applicants can choose between a regular patent and a more costly, possibly more thoroughly examined, 'gold-plate' patent. Introducing a second patent-tier can reduce patent applications, reduce the incidence of bad patents, and sometimes increase social welfare. The gold-plate tier attracts inventors with high ex-ante probability of validity, but not necessarily applicants with innovations of high economic value.

AB - In this paper, we study the determinants of patent quality and volume of patent applications when inventors care about perceived patent quality. We analyze the effects of various policy reforms, specifically, a proposal to establish a two-tiered patent system. In the two-tiered system, applicants can choose between a regular patent and a more costly, possibly more thoroughly examined, 'gold-plate' patent. Introducing a second patent-tier can reduce patent applications, reduce the incidence of bad patents, and sometimes increase social welfare. The gold-plate tier attracts inventors with high ex-ante probability of validity, but not necessarily applicants with innovations of high economic value.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84906728085&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1111/joie.12055

DO - 10.1111/joie.12055

M3 - Article

VL - 62

SP - 503

EP - 540

JO - Journal of Industrial Economics

JF - Journal of Industrial Economics

SN - 0022-1821

IS - 3

ER -