Abstract
Although still controversial, there is growing evidence that information about the self is processed in the right hemisphere, specifically the right frontal lobe. It has also been hypothesized that self-awareness and mental state attribution (inferences about the mental experience of others) are part of a similar neurocognitive process [Am. J. Primatol. 2 (1982) 237]. Here we measured blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) activity when viewing self-faces and when thinking about the mental states of others. We found significant activation in right superior, middle, and inferior frontal gyri when activation associated with self-face processing was compared with activation associated with familiar famous face processing. Mental state attribution, as measured by a computerized version of the Mind in the Eyes - Revised Test, was associated with activation in the right superior and middle frontal gyri, medial superior frontal gyrus, and left middle frontal gyrus and superior temporal gyrus/temporal pole. Self-face recognition and mental state attribution were colocalized to the middle and superior frontal gyri in the right hemisphere. These data support a model developed over two decades ago by Gallup [Am. J. Primatol. 2 (1982) 237] that posits that self-awareness and mental state attribution are part of a shared neurocognitive suite of processing and that neural architecture implicated in processing knowledge about the self is called upon when inferring knowledge in others.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 114-122 |
| Number of pages | 9 |
| Journal | Cognitive Brain Research |
| Volume | 19 |
| Issue number | 2 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 1 Apr 2004 |
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Keywords
- Cognition
- fMRI
- Mental state attribution
- Mind in the eyes
- Neurol basis of behavior
- Right hemisphere
- Self-awareness
- Self-face
- Self-recognition
- Theory of mind
Cite this
}
Where am I? The neurological correlates of self and other. / Platek, Steven M.; Keenan, Julian; Gallup, Gordon G.; Mohamed, Feroze B.
In: Cognitive Brain Research, Vol. 19, No. 2, 01.04.2004, p. 114-122.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article
TY - JOUR
T1 - Where am I? The neurological correlates of self and other
AU - Platek, Steven M.
AU - Keenan, Julian
AU - Gallup, Gordon G.
AU - Mohamed, Feroze B.
PY - 2004/4/1
Y1 - 2004/4/1
N2 - Although still controversial, there is growing evidence that information about the self is processed in the right hemisphere, specifically the right frontal lobe. It has also been hypothesized that self-awareness and mental state attribution (inferences about the mental experience of others) are part of a similar neurocognitive process [Am. J. Primatol. 2 (1982) 237]. Here we measured blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) activity when viewing self-faces and when thinking about the mental states of others. We found significant activation in right superior, middle, and inferior frontal gyri when activation associated with self-face processing was compared with activation associated with familiar famous face processing. Mental state attribution, as measured by a computerized version of the Mind in the Eyes - Revised Test, was associated with activation in the right superior and middle frontal gyri, medial superior frontal gyrus, and left middle frontal gyrus and superior temporal gyrus/temporal pole. Self-face recognition and mental state attribution were colocalized to the middle and superior frontal gyri in the right hemisphere. These data support a model developed over two decades ago by Gallup [Am. J. Primatol. 2 (1982) 237] that posits that self-awareness and mental state attribution are part of a shared neurocognitive suite of processing and that neural architecture implicated in processing knowledge about the self is called upon when inferring knowledge in others.
AB - Although still controversial, there is growing evidence that information about the self is processed in the right hemisphere, specifically the right frontal lobe. It has also been hypothesized that self-awareness and mental state attribution (inferences about the mental experience of others) are part of a similar neurocognitive process [Am. J. Primatol. 2 (1982) 237]. Here we measured blood oxygen level-dependent (BOLD) activity when viewing self-faces and when thinking about the mental states of others. We found significant activation in right superior, middle, and inferior frontal gyri when activation associated with self-face processing was compared with activation associated with familiar famous face processing. Mental state attribution, as measured by a computerized version of the Mind in the Eyes - Revised Test, was associated with activation in the right superior and middle frontal gyri, medial superior frontal gyrus, and left middle frontal gyrus and superior temporal gyrus/temporal pole. Self-face recognition and mental state attribution were colocalized to the middle and superior frontal gyri in the right hemisphere. These data support a model developed over two decades ago by Gallup [Am. J. Primatol. 2 (1982) 237] that posits that self-awareness and mental state attribution are part of a shared neurocognitive suite of processing and that neural architecture implicated in processing knowledge about the self is called upon when inferring knowledge in others.
KW - Cognition
KW - fMRI
KW - Mental state attribution
KW - Mind in the eyes
KW - Neurol basis of behavior
KW - Right hemisphere
KW - Self-awareness
KW - Self-face
KW - Self-recognition
KW - Theory of mind
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=1542351276&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2003.11.014
DO - 10.1016/j.cogbrainres.2003.11.014
M3 - Article
C2 - 15019708
AN - SCOPUS:1542351276
VL - 19
SP - 114
EP - 122
JO - Cognitive Brain Research
JF - Cognitive Brain Research
SN - 0926-6410
IS - 2
ER -